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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
obvious reasons this criticism with regard to signatures is nor-
mally not valid with respect to a picture of the holder on the
card except where an imposter is able to substitute his picture
for that of the holder.
Issuers might argue that the above suggestions impair the
convenience and popularity of the credit card arrangement.
However, such requirements would not be detrimental to the
holder. The detriment would accrue only to the issuer in that
he might suffer economic loss in several ways: (1) he may have
to keep account of his customers' balances on a continuous basis,
(2) he may jeopardize his goodwill by disallowing the holder's
son, daughter, wife, or any other transferee privileges of a credit
card which is nontransferable, and (3) he may embarass his
customer by examining the customer's signature and photo-
graph appearing on the card. However, it should be stressed
that effective safeguards to unauthorized use of the lost or
stolen credit card, in the absence of either party's negligence,
can be effectuated only by imposing certain burdens upon the
issuer, since it is he and not the holder who deals with the im-
poster and thus he is the party who should take reasonable
steps to ascertain the identity of the user of the card.39
Contracts: State's Contractual Obligation Contingent
Upon Legislative Appropriation Held Valid
In October 1966, Minnesota's Commissioner of Administra-
tion executed a contract with the Walter Butler Company for
architectural services for a state college building program.' At
the time of execution there were no appropriated funds avail-
able for the project. In consideration of Butler's promise to
perform preliminary work, the state agreed to engage the
company for all other architectural and engineering work con-
nected with the project, when and if an appropriation therefor
39. Again an analogy can be made to negotiable instruments where
the party who bears the loss of a forged signature or indorsement is
often the party who dealt with the forger. See generally UNIFoRM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-417.
1. The Butler Company had already done all the architectural and
engineering work on Phase I of the project. Phase II, the subject of the
contract in question, essentially involved additions to the structures
built in Phase I. Payment for the preliminary work on Phase II was
to be made from the contingent appropriation.
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was made by the legislature. In March 1967, a new Commis-
sioner of Administration notified the Butler Company that he
considered the contract illegal and the state not bound thereby.
Mrs. Butler brought a taxpayer's action to enjoin the state from
making a contract for the same work with another architectural
firm. The state appealed from the trial court's granting of a
temporary injunction. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that
the contract was valid as a reasonable exercise of the prior
Commissioner's statutory authority, and affirmed the granting
of the temporary injunction. Butler v. Hatfield, 152 N.W.2d
484 (Minn. 1967).
The statutes applicable to state contracts are part of the
1939 Reorganization Act2 which was intended as a regulation of
all phases of state spending. The Act sets up four separate
procedures-appropriation, allotment, encumbrance, and pay-
ment. First, estimates of expenditures for each fiscal year of
the future biennium are collected by the Commissioner of Ad-
ministration from all departments, officials, and agencies of the
state.3 Based on these estimates, the appropriations are made
by the legislature.4 The appropriated amounts are then al-
lotted to the various departments by the Commissioner, insofar
as the respective estimates are within the amount and purpose
of the appropriations.5 By allotment, the lump sum appropria-
tion is broken up into small amounts which are periodically
given to the various departments, preventing a department from
spending its whole appropriation in the first part of the bien-
nium. Every "receipt, account, bill, claim, refund, and demand
against the state" is examined by the State Auditor and, if they
are valid and sufficient funds are still available, he marks the
appropriate allotment "encumbered."0  Upon demand for pay-
ment, the Auditor checks the allotment to see that there is a
sufficient unencumbered balance and then issues his warrant
which must be presented to the State Treasurer for actual
payment.
One statute, not within the scheme of the Reorganization
Act, seems applicable to the question before the court in Butler.
This statute authorizes the Commissioner to have plans for
buildings prepared, with funds for payment to come from the
2. Ch. 431, [1939] Minn. Laws 908.
3. MnqN. STAT. § 16.14 (1965).
4. Mmx. STAT. § 16.15 (1965).
5. MiNN. STAT. § 16.16 (1965).
6. Id.
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unappropriated residue in the state treasury.7  However, the
court ignored this statute since it applied only to the part of
the contract promising payment for the preliminary plans8 and
cannot be used to support a decision on the validity of the
state's contingent promise to award Butler the contract for all
additional architectural work on the project.
The problem in Butler was one which had not been previ-
ously considered by the Minnesota Supreme Courtf Of the
few states with comparable statutory restrictions 0 which have
considered questions similar to that presented in Butler, a ma-
jority have reached a contrary result;.11 In so doing, these juris-
7. MINN. STAT. § 16.32 (1965) provides:
The commissioner of administration shall prepare plans for all
. . . buildings costing more than $1,000, for which he may rec-
ommend an appropriation. These plans shall be paid for out of
any money in the state treasury, not otherwise appropriated,
but when appropriation has been made for the purpose of con-
structing such building, the fund from which payment for plans
was made shall be reimbursed from such appropriation....
8. To authorize this much of the contract, § 16.32 must be read
as a standing appropriation or it would violate MAn. CONST. art. IV,
§ 12 and MuN. CONST. art. III, § 1. However, this statute-first passed
in 1901 as an authorization for prison buildings, ch. 122, § 29, [1901]
Minn. Laws 141-and § 3.24 of the Minnesota Statutes both indicate that
§ 16.32 is not a standing appropriation. Section 3.24, enacted in 1933,
repealed all standing appropriations. This included § 16.32 if it was a
standing appropriation. However, § 16.32 was re-enacted in 1965 when
a subdivision relating to federal funds was added to it. Since the leg-
islature manifested a policy against standing appropriations in § 3.24 it
is arguable that the 1965 legislature, when re-enacting § 16.32, did not
intend that it be construed as a standing appropriation. See State v.
City of Duluth, 238 Minn. 128, 56 N.W.2d 416 (1953) (construing § 3.24
to create a strong legislative policy against all standing appropriations).
9. The court had held that money could not be paid out of the
treasury in absence of an appropriation, even when the obligation to do
so had been created by statute. County of Beltrami v. Marshall, 271
Minn. 115, 135 N.W.2d 749 (1965); State ex rel. Chase v. Preus, 147
Minn. 125, 179 N.W. 725 (1920). These cases are distinguishable from
Butler since they involved obligations created by statute and the
validity of the obligation itself was never in question.
10. Several jurisdictions with dissimilar statutory schemes have
considered like questions. In O'Neil v. Goldenetz, 53 Ariz. 51, 85 P.2d
705 (1938), the court followed the basic reasoning of State ex rel.
Armontrout v. Smith, 353 Mo. 486, 182 S.W.2d 571 (1944), discussed in
note 14 infra, but since no statute requiring an auditor's certificate was
involved, the question was whether there was statutory authorization to
make the contract. The court in Peck v. City of New Orleans, 199 La.
75, 5 So. 2d 508 (1941), avoided the issue by summarily stating that a
restriction on payment without appropriation does not affect the power
to contract. See also Miller Ins. Agency v. Porter, 93 Mont. 567, 20 P.2d
643 (1933) (time limitations on appropriations); Charles Scribner's Sons
v. Marrs, 114 Tex. 11, 262 S.W. 722 (1924).
11. In accord with the reasoning of these jurisdictions, it has been
[Vol. 52:892
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dictions rely mainly on the plain meaning of the statutes in-
volved, 12 and the desire to maintain the protections against
fraud embodied in those statutes. 13 Only Missouri appears to
have reached a result similar to that in Butler. In State ex rel.
Armontrout v. Smith, 4 the Missouri court held that a valid
stated that
An award of a contract conditioned upon some other board or
body making an appropriation or an additional appropriation is
invalid. The appropriation must precede the contract in point
of existence. So when an appropriation for only part of the
cost of a contract exists, an agreement to enter into a contract
to complete the work, when requested to do so, on condition
that a further appropriation be made, is void.
J. DONNELLY, THE LAW Or PUBLIC CONTRACTS § 146 (1922).
12. See, e.g., State ex rel. Point Towing Co. v. McDonough, 150 W.
Va. 724, 149 S.E.2d 302 (1966), construing W. VA. CODE § 12-3-17 (1931),
which provided: "It shall be unlawful for any State board, commission,
officer or employee to incur any liability during any fiscal year which
cannot be paid out of the then current appropriation for such year ......
The McDonough court said that the equity of the case was clearly with
the plaintiff, but that "the law must be administered as it is written."
See also State ex rel. Brooks Equip. & Mfg. Co. v. Evatt, 137 Ohio St.
125, 28 N.E.2d 360 (1940), construing OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 131.17
(1966), which provides:
No officer, board, or commission of the state shall enter into
any contract, agreement, or obligation involving the expendi-
ture of money, . . .unless the director of finance first certifies
that there is a balance in the appropriation, not otherwise obli-
gated to pay precedent obligations, pursuant to which such
obligation is required to be paid.
13. In Evatt, the court stated that to hold the contract valid would
encourage the practice of executing long-term contracts in one bien-
nium with certification of the availability of funds postponed until sub-
sequent biennia. It felt that such a practice would be conducive to
fraudulent and wasteful state spending. See also Hinkle v. Philadelphia,
214 Pa. St. 126, 63 A. 590 (1906). See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 118
App. Div. 756, 104 N.Y.S. 14, affd mem., 192 N.Y. 541, 84 N.E. 1123
(1907). In Williams the plaintiff's bid was accepted subject to the ap-
proval of an appropriation of an additional $14,000. The appropriation
was made but the city refused to award the contract. The court held
the contract invalid because the board of trustees had no authority to
award the contract before the full amount had been appropriated. The
court reasoned that although there was no indication of fraud in the
case before them, this was no reason to weaken the defenses against
fraud.
14. 353 Mo. 486, 182 S.W.2d 571 (1944). In Armontrout, a Missouri
statute provided reimbursement for cattle slaughtered in fighting
Bang's disease. In the action for payment, the state claimed the con-
tract was invalid since it had been made before funds were appropriated.
The court stated that the Missouri Budget Law could not be construed
to invalidate contracts expressly authorized by subsequent legislation,
reasoning that an implied contract with the state for payment of the
statutory amount was created when the plaintiff sent his cattle to
slaughter. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 33.040 (1949) provided:
No expenditure shall be made and no obligation incurred by
any department without the following certifications:
1968]
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agreement could be made in advance of an appropriation if it
was expressly authorized by statute.
The decision in Butler was based on two premises. The
first was that the contract in no way obligated the state prior
to an appropriation. The court stated that at the time notice of
cancellation was sent, the Butler Company had no enforceable
contract, but merely a "proposal" to receive enforceable rights
when and if an appropriation was made.15 The second premise
was that the contract was a reasonable exercise of the Commis-
sioner's statutory authority and in the state's best interests.
The court pointed out that an architect was needed to prepare
plans to support an application for federal aid, and that much
valuable time would have been lost and additional expense in-
curred if the Commissioner had been forced to wait for the
1967 legislature to make an appropriation." The court also
stated that there had been no claim that the contract was en-
tered into to further personal interests or that the work done
was of inferior quality, nor had there been a showing that the
contract was an unreasonable infringement on the powers of a
successor in office. Apparently applying principles of estoppel,
the court stated that the state had induced the Butler Company
to render valuable services by a proposal seemingly within the
authority of the Commissioner and, since the agreement was not
invalid on its face, the state should not be allowed to repudiate
it. 1 7
By general principles of contract law, the court's first prem-
ise is questionable. Each party to a contract must obligate
himself in some manner, at the time of execution of the contract,
or his promise is illusory and may be repudiated. Therefore, if
the state was not obligated until m appropriation was made,
there was arguably no contract until. that time, and the successor
Commissioner should have been allowed to disavow the state's
contingent promise, unless his actions had estopped him from
making such a repudiation. However, the state's promise was
not illusory as it had limited its sphere of permissible actions.'8
(2) Certification by the auditor that the expenditure is within
the purpose of the appropriation and that there is in the ap-
propriation an unencumbered balance sufficient to pay it.
See County of Beltrami v. Marshall, 271 Minn. 115, 135 N.W.2d 749
(1965).
15. 152 N.W.2d at 496.
16. But see notes 7-8 supra.
17. 152 N.W.2d at 496.
18. See A. CoRBn, CoNmTAcTs § 149 (one vol. ed. 1952).
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When the appropriation was made, the state was obligated to
award the contract to the Butler Company and pay it for its
preliminary work. This obligation, although contingent, was
the kind of present obligation that is sufficient to form a binding
contract.19
If there was a binding contractual obligation on the part of
the state, the court should have dealt with the relevant sections
of the Reorganization Act rather than merely citing them with-
out discussion. Section 6.23 of the Minnesota Statutes provides:
Unless otherwise expressly provided by law, no money ...
shall be expended or applied by any official, department, or
agency of the state government . . . except under authority of
an appropriation by law and an allotment relating thereto as
herein provided and upon warrant of the auditor. (Emphasis
added.)
This section has been indirectly construed as always requiring a
legislative appropriation as a prerequisite to state liability.20
The key word in this section is "applied" and it must therefore
be decided whether the Butler contract had "applied" state
money without either appropriation by the legislature or allot-
ment by the Auditor. Since "expended" is used alternatively
with "applied," it would seem that something more than mere
cash expenditures was intended to be regulated by the section.
Indeed, if only cash expenditures were meant to be restricted
there would be no need for the regulations provided by the
first three steps of the Reorganization Act-appropriation, allot-
ment and encumbrance-as the problem would be adequately
covered by the regulations in the payment step. The intended
effect of the first three steps was to prevent prohibited claims
from coming into existence, not simply to provide a method to
avoid payment. Therefore, a contractual obligation is arguably
an application of money under section 6.23 and, if so, the Butler
contract would be invalid unless it was of a type "otherwise ex-
pressly provided [for] by law." Although section 16.3221 may be
viewed as express statutory authorization for the contract, the
statute is, at best, only partially applicable. Therefore, the But-
ler agreement would not be excepted from the prohibition by
the introductory language of section 6.23.
Further, section 10.17 provides: ". . . It is hereby made
unlawful for any state board or official to incur any indebted-
19. See 3A A. Cominw, Comr ON CoxNtAcTs § 728 (2d ed. 1960).
20. County of Beltrami v. Marshall, 271 Minn. 115, 121, 135 N.W.2d
749, 753 (1965).
21. See notes 7-8 supra.
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ness on behalf of the board, the official, or the state of any
nature until after an appropriation therefor has been made by
the legislature ... ." (Emphasis added.) This statute has
been interpreted by the Attorney General to mean that monies
appropriated for one purpose can be used for that purpose
only, and cannot be used to satisfy even closely related debts.22
The key to this section of the statute is the word "indebt-
edness." Normally this word is construed to mean only a
present, due, financial indebtedness incurred by a contractual
obligation.2 3  Here, the fact that "indebtedness" is followed
by the phrase "of any nature" arguably indicates that the state's
obligation under an executory contract was meant to be in-
cluded within the scope of the statute.
Lastly, section 16.16 (8) provides:
No payment shall be made and no obligation shall be in-
curred against any fund, allotment, or appropriation unless the
state auditor shall first certify that there is a sufficient unen-
cumbered balance in such fund, allotment, or appropriation to
meet the same. Every expenditure or obligation authorized or
incurred in violation of the provisions of Laws 1939, Chapter
431, shall be presumed invalid....
If the Butler agreement is enforceable, it would seem that the
state must have incurred an "obligation" within the terms of
this section.24 However, since there was no available fund, allot-
ment, or appropriation at the time of execution of the contract,
it was impossible for the Auditor to certify an unencumbered
balance in that nonexistent fund. Indeed, the Butler contract
was marked "unencumbered" by the Auditor. Clearly, the But-
ler contract appears to be invalidated by the above statute.
However, the Reorganization Act was enacted to prevent
state officials from spending money without legislative approval
and control. The Act is primarily concerned with the constitu-
tional provision that no state money shall be expended in the
absence of an appropriation. Because of the contingency in-
volved in the Butler contract the legislature had not been de-
22. Op. MINN. AmrY GEN., 9-A-34, June 3, 1955; Op. Mx. ATT'y
GEN., 9-A-24, Dec. 15, 1947.
23. Farmers State Bank v. Sig Ellingson & Co., 218 Minn. 411, 16
N.W.2d 319 (1944); McCrea v. First Nat'1 Bank, 162 Minn. 455, 203 N.W.
220 (1925).
24. Aumn. STAT. § 16.10 (1965) provides that "no purchase order or
contract shall be valid or effective without ... the counter-signature
of the auditor, who shall certify that the appropriation and allotment
have been encumbered for the full amount of the contract liability."
This statute makes clear that the "obligation" referred to in § 16.16(8)
is meant to be the type of obligation incurred in an executory contract.
[Vol. 52:892
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prived of its power to decide to what use state money shall be
put, and no money will be paid out of the treasury before there
is an appropriation. Therefore, it is arguable that the poli-
cies behind the provisions of the Reorganization Act are not
violated by the Butler situation. However, in order to recognize
this fact, the court had to ignore the above mentioned contract
principles before it could avoid the language of the sections.
Such a situation would seem to indicate a need for revision of
the provisions of the Reorganization Act to accommodate the
type of situation which Butler has presented.
Since the court did not use the statutes of the Reorganiza-
tion Act in deciding the instant case, it had to determine
whether or not the contract was a reasonable exercise of the
Commissioner's authority and served the best interests of the
state. In so doing it looked to whether these interests were
served, rather than to whether a Butler type contract should be
recognized as a valid way to serve these interests. This ap-
proach has left the validity of a Butler type contract to be de-
cided on a case-by-case basis. The importance of determining
the validity of the state's contracts requires more certainty than
is afforded by such an approach. The court should have bal-
anced the benefits of such a contract against the evils it might
engender in order to determine the validity of the Butler class
of contracts as a whole.
There is no doubt that a Butler type contract presents
beneficial aspects for judicial consideration. This method of
contracting gives the Commissioner of Administration addi-
tional freedom in contracting for the state.25 This freedom, if
judiciously used, could save the state both time and money.
Under the present system the legislature is often forced to
make appropriations without adequate preliminary information,
since no work can be done before appropriated funds are avail-
able. The Butler type contract provides a method for com-
piling such preliminary information to aid the legislature in
determining what amount should be appropriated for a project.
Further, such a contract is beneficial in a time of ever increas-
ing federal aid to states in that it provides a flexible way to
prepare plans and estimates for submission to the federal
25. In W. ANERsON & E. WEIDNER, STATE AND LOCAL GoVERNmENT
609 (1951), it is said that in this age of more responsible government
more freedom should be given to the state as to how and where it can
spend its money. "[T]ying up money in funds for purposes of no im-
mediate need does not seem to be sound financing." Id.
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government at any time, not merely when the legislature is in
session.
However, there are negative aspects of a Butler type con-
tract which must be balanced against its benefits. Such a con-
tract presents an opportunity for one state officer to wrong-
fully bind his successor as well as affording an opportunity for
graft and corruption in the highest echelons of state govern-
ment.26 Nevertheless, these are dangers which are present to
some extent in all state contracts, and the court suggested an
answer to these problems in its opinion when it stated that
the legislature could negate the Butler type of agreement by
specifying in its appropriation bill that no part of the funds
should be applied for payment of past or future architectural
services by the Butler Company.27
Such a solution, however, depends on knowledge by the
legislature of the existence of the contract. Perhaps a con-
crete solution to this type of problem would be the enact-
ment of a statute requiring that the legislature be informed of
any Butler type contract which might affect pending appropria-
tion bills. Such a statute would require the legislature to con-
sider any such contract in light of whether or not it was in
the state's best interest. Failing -to pass the requisite "best
interest" test, the statute would permit the legislature to
affix the necessary disclaimer with regard to that particular
contract. Alternatively, such a proposed statute could provide
that all Butler type contracts are invalid unless the legislature
affixes a clause to the appropriation bill specifically authorizing
them. This solution would give stronger protection to the
26. The possibility that the Butler type contract will encourage
corrupt lobbying is another problem which the court did not consider.
Contracts made with a third party to influence legislation, with payment
on a contingent fee basis, have consistently been declared void as against
public policy by the United States Supreme Court. Hazelton v. Sheck-
ells, 202 U.S. 71 (1906); Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441 (1874);
Gesellschaft Fur Drahtlose Telegraphie M.B.H. v. Brown, 78 F.2d 410
(D.C. Cir. 1935). It has been said that such an agreement has a ten-
dency to induce a lobbyist to attempt to corrupt or unduly influence
legislators to pass the bill on which his fee depends. Grover v. Merritt
Dev. Co., 47 F. Supp. 309 (D. Minn. 1942). The test applied is not what
was done, but what the terms of the contract encouraged. Id. Although
a Butler type contract would not be for the express purpose of lobbying,
the policy reasons behind the prohibition of a contingent fee lobbying
contract are equally applicable. The contractor's pay for his work
product is contingent upon a legislative act, and therefore the same
factors are present which have led courts to invalidate contingent fee
lobbying contracts as against public policy.
27. 152 N.W.2d at 496.
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